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Commission of Utah; ALEXANDER BUILDING
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SHAW INC., a corporation; SOUTHEAST INC.,
a corporation; S.ALT LAKE COUNTY CONSERVANCY DISTRICT, a body politic; BERTHA SHEPHERD; BERNARD P. BROCKBANK, doing business as the Brockbank Realty
and Construction Company; GEORGE H.
SMEATH, MARY H. SMEATH and J. K.
THAYN,
Defendants and Respondents.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY WATER SYSTEM, INC., a corporation, ALMA H. COTTAM, MEEKS WIRTHLIN·
and ADRIAN WRIGHT, a partnership, doing
business as Wright-Wirthlin Company, JOHN 0.
SPECK, McDONALD BROS., INC., a corporation; JOSEPH McDONALD; and KEITH L.
KNIGHT, doing business as Knight Realty
Company,

Plaintiffs and App·ellants,
-vs.-

SALT LAKE CITY, a Municipal corporation;
METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF
SALT LAKE ·CITY, a body politic; the PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH, a
Commission of Utah; ALEXANDER BUILDING
CORPORATION OF UTAH, a corporation;
SHAW INC., a corporation; SOUTHEAST INC.,
a corporation; SALT LAKE COUNTY CONSERVANCY DISTRICT, a body politic; BERTHA SHEPHERD; BERNARD P. BROCKBANK, doing business as the Brockbank Realty
and Construction Company; GEORGE H.
SMEATH, MARY H. SMEATH and J. K.
THAYN,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
8206

BRIEF' OF PLAINTIF·FS AND APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF CASE
This is. a proceeding brought under the D·ecla.ratory
Judgment Act, Title 78, Chapter 33, Utah ·Code Anno·tated, 1953.
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To tlie p·etition for a D·eclaratory Judgment filed by
the plaintiff a numher of defendants filed Motions to
Dismiss the petition which Motions were granted and
the Petition dismissed. (R. 1-15)
The plaintiffs prosecute this appeal from the judgment dismissing the petition. _The provisions of the
Declaratory Judgment Act which authorized the prosecution of this proceeding provide:
"78-33-1. The district courts within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare
rights, status and other legal relations, whether or
not further relief is or could be claimed. No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the
ground that a declaratory judgment or decree is
prayed for. The declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect; and such
declaration shall h·ave the force and effect of a
final judgment or decree.
"78-33-2. Any person ... whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance contract or franchise,
.
may have determined any 'question of construction
or validity arising under the ... statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.
'

"78-33-5. The enumeration in sections 7833-2 . . . does not limit or restrict the -exercise
of the general powers conferred in Section 78-33-1
in any proceeding 'vhere declaratory relief is
sough't, in which a judgment or decree will terminate the controversy or remove an uncertainty.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"78-33-11. When declaratory relief is sought
all persons shall be made p·arties who have or
·claim any interest which would he affected by
the declaration, and no declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the p·roceeding. In any proceeding which involves the
validity of a municipal or county ordinance or
franchise such municipality or county shall be
made a party, and shall be entitled to he· heard,
and if a statute or state franchise or permit is alleged to be invalid the attorney general shall be
served with a copy of the proceeding and be entitled to be heard.
"78-33-12. This chapter is declared to be
remedial; its purpose is to settle and to afford
relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status and other legal relations ;
and is to be liberally construed and administered."
The Petition filed by the plaintiffs herein in substance alleges :
That the plaintiff, County Water System is a corporation, duly organized and existing under the laws of the
State of Utah and as such on F·eb. 26, 1951 had issued to
it a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity whereby it
is authorized to furnish and it is now engaged in furnishing culinary water to the inha.bi tan ts of an area particularly described in the petition, which area is vvithout the boundaries of defendant, Salt Lake City, and
within Salt Lake County; that the plaintiff, County
Water System has a water supply which is ample to provide for the needs of the area which it is authorized to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

serve, and it has expended in excess of $150,000.00 in the
construction of a system to furnish the inhabitants within
such area with culinary water. It is further alleged in
the petition that the plaintiff, Alma H. Cottam, is a
property owner and tax payer in Salt Lake City, and
that the other plaintiffs are the owners or have an interest in the lands mentioned in paragraph one of the
petition; that the defendants are what they are designated as being in the title of this proceeding. The following further allegations are quot·ed from the p·etition:

12. That plaintiffs are informed and believe and
upon such information and belief allege the facts to be
that the parties to this action, plaintiffs and defendants,
all have or claim to have an interest and they are the only
parties. who do have an interest in the subject matter of
this ·action.
13.

That it 1s provided by U.C.A., 1953 10-8-14

that:
"They (cities) may construct, maintain and
operate waterworks, gas works, electric light
works, telephone lines or street railways, or authorize the construction, maintenance and operation of the same by oth.ers, or purchase or lease
such works from any person or corporation, and
they may sell and deliver the surplus product or
service of any such works, not required by the city
or its inhabitants, to others beyond the· limits. of
the city."
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14. That the defendant Public Service Commission
of Utah is by U.C.A., 1953 54-4-1 vested with power and
jurisdiction to supervise and regulate every public utility
in this state, and to supervise all of the business of every
such public utility in this state, and to ao all things,
whether herein specifically designated or in addition
thereto which are necessary or convenient in the exercise
of such powers and juri~sdiction.
15. Among the public utilities provided for by the
La,vs of Utah is a water corporation which is defined
in U.C.A. 1953, 54-2-1 subsection 26, as including every
corporation and person, their lessees, trustees and receivers or trustees appointed by any court whatsoever,
owning, controiling, operating or managing any water
system for public service within this state; provided this
shall not apply to a private irrigation company engaged
in distributing water only to their stockholders.
16.

U.C.A., 1953 54-2-1, subsection 28, among other

rna tters provides :
"The term 'public utility' includes every ...
water corporation . . . which performs a service
for or delivers a eommodity to the public for
which any compensation or payment whatsoever
is received, such ... water corporation is hereby
declared to be a public utility, subject to the jurisdiction and regulation of the commis~ion and to
the provisions of this title. Except, as hereinafter
provided, when any person or corporation performs any such service for or delivers any such
commodity to any public utility herein defined,
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~uch p·erson or corporation, and each thereof,
1s h~reby declared to be a public utility, and to be

subJect to the jurisdiction and regulation of the
commission and to the provisions of this title.
Any corporation or person not engaged in business exclusively as a public utility a.s hereinbefore
defined shall be _governed by the provisions of this
title in respect only to the public utility or public
utilities owned, controlled, operated or managed
hy it or by him, and not in respect to any other
business or pursuit.
"Provided, that whenever any p-erson, association, company or corporation, not engaged in
business as a p·ublic utility as defined by this act
shall be able to produce a surplus of electric
energy or power, gas or water, beyond the needs
of its own business and shall desire to sell, exchange, deliver or otherwise dispose of such surplus to or "\vith any public utility as in this act
defined, such public utility desiring to effect a
p·urchase or exchange of such surpJus shall sub1nit
to the commission, for authorization by said commission, a p·roposed contract covering~ such purchase or exchange. The commission shall thereupon determine, after a public hearing, whether,
in the public interest, it sh.all be advisable that
such contract be executed and, if not adverse to
the p·ublic interest, said commission shall authorize the execution of said contract, and thereupon
such public utility shall have the right to purchase and receive or exchange such surplus product in accordance with the terms of such contract.
Such person, company, corporation or association
selling or exchanging such surplus product under
such authorized contract shall not thereby becon1e
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a public utility within the meaning of this act,
nor shall it be subject to the jurisdiction of the
commission."

17. That the provisions of U.C.A., 1953, 10-8-14
above quoted is uncertain, and in light of the claimed
authority of defendant Salt Lake City as hereinafter
alleged, needs construction as to what may lawfully be
done by defendant city by way of the delivery of water
not needed by the city beyond the limits, of the city.
18. That the provisions of U.C.A., 1953, 54-2-1,
subsection 28 above quoted is uncertain and in light of the
claimed authority of defendant Salt Lake City, as hereinafter alleged, needs construction as to what may lawfully
be done by defendant city with respect to the construction,
regulation and control of water and water systems beyond the limits of the city and as to whether or not a city
may be regulated by the defendant, Public Service Commission of Utah.
19. That notwithstanding the provisions of the statutory la\v above mentioned the defendant, Salt Lake City,
claims the following rights and is exercising or threatening to exercise the following functions:
(a) That the defendant, Salt Lake City, may do as
it desires in the n1atter of selling and delivering its
surplus water outside of its limits without being in any
way subject to the jurisdiction of the defendant, Public
Service Con1mission of Utah.
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(b) That the defendant, Salt Lake City, may lawfully enter into contracts to furnish water within the
area described in p~aragraph 1 of this Petition without
permission so to do by the defendant, Public Service
Commission of Utah, and that by so doing neither of the
plaintiffs have any legal cause to complain.
(c) That by the provisions of U.C.A. 1953, 10-8-14,
the defendant city is granted authority to make a contract with anyone who will build a pipeline for the purpose of delivering culinary water to the inhabi~ants
within the area described in paragraph 1 of this complaint and provides in such contract that the defendant
city will make a payment or refund to the one constructing such a pipe line in the sum of $150.00 for each service
connection made with the pip·e line so constructed.
(d) That if and when a pipe line for the delivery
of culinary water is constructed within the area described
in paragraph 1 of this co1nplaint, the defendant city has
authority to take over the complete operation and control
of such pipe line, deliver water through such pipe line
to all who have connections thereto, fix the amount of
charges for each connection, collect such charges and
exercise dominion over such pipe line the san1e as it could
do if it \vere the absolute owner thereof.
(e) That the defen·dant city has the authority to p~re
pare and carry out an over-all plan to furnish culinary
water to all of the area described in paragraph 1 of this
cornplaint.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(f) That the defendant city has authority to supply
culinary water to any or all of the inhabitants within the
area described in paragraph 1 of the complaint without
regard to whether or not the plaintiff, County Water System, Inc., is injured thereby.
The plaintiffs contend that the proVIsions of the
laws of Utah and particularly U.C.A., 1953, 54-4-1 and
U.C.A. 1953, 54-2-1, subsection 28, when properly construed gives to the defendant, Public Service Commission of lTtah, jurisdiction over the defendant city with
respect to all culinary \vater sold and delivered outside
of such defendant city, that is to say, the defendant city
may sell and deliver water only to a public utility as provided in lT.C.A. 1953, 54-2-1, subsection 28, or to someone for his own use and benefit, and that the defendant
City is without auth.ority to control or operate a water
system outside of the City. So also is it the contention
of the plaintiffs that the defendant City is without authority to directly or indirectly expend any of its funds
for the construction, repair or operation of pipel~es
or other facilities which are for the purpose of carrying
water from the water system constructed for supplying
the City and its inhabitants with culinary water to the
consumer of water who resides outside of the city.
20.

That if the defendant City is permitted to cause

to be constructed a culinary system within the area described in paragraph one of this petition and supply the
inhabitants within said area with culinary water, the
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plaintiff, County W'ater System, Inc., will suffer irreparable injury and some of the money which plaintiff,
Alma H. Cottam, pays in taxes or otherwise will unlawfully be expended by defendant City in paying for
the construction, repair or operation of a water system
outside of the corporate limits of defendant City.
21. That a construction by this Court of the extent
of the authority, extent and limitation of the right of
the defendant City to sell and deliver water, to e·xpend
money of the defendant City, and to operate and control
\Vater systems outside of the City, will remove the uncertainty hereinbefore alleged and settle the controversy between the parties to this proceeding.

WHEREF·ORE, plaintiffs pray judgment:
I. That the court construe the provisions of U.C.A.
19·53, 10-8-4 and U.C.A. 1953, 54-2-1, subsection 28, to the
end that the defendant, Salt Lake City, is without authority to sell or deliver any water within the area described in pHragraph 1 of this petition, except as to the
plaintiff, County Water System, Inc.
II. That the defendant City is without authority to
operate a water system for the delivery of \Vater outside
of its limits.
III. That the~ defendant City be enjoined from constructing or aiding in the construction or repair of a
water systen1 for the distribution of culinary water to inhabitants outside of its limits.
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IV. That the defendant City be enjoined from engaging in the control and operation of a water system
outside of its limits.
V. That such other and further judgment and decree be entered in this cause as may appear to the court
proper and that plaintiffs be awarded their costs.
As heretofore stated in this brief, a number of the
defendants filed motions to dismiss the above mentioned
petition filed herein upon the ground that the petition
fails to state a claim against the defendants upon which
relief can be granted and that said motions were granted
and the petition dismissed. Plaintiffs refused to further plead and prosecute this appeal from the judgment
of dismissal.
The points and errors upon which plaintiffs rely for
a reversal of the judgment appealed from are as follows:
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
PETITION HEREIN.

POINT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSTRUE THE PROVISIONS OF U.C.A. 1953, 54-2-1,
SUBDIVISIONS 3, 26 AND 28, TO THE EFFECT
TI-IAT THE DEFENDANT, SALT LAKE CITY, IS
WITHOUT AUTHORITY TO SELL OR DELIVER ANY
WATER WITHIN THE AREA DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE PETITION FILED HEREIN EXCEPT WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE DEFENDANT
COMMISSION AND ONLY TO THE PLAINTIFF,
COU:t--ITY WATER SYSTEM, IN~C., OR OTHER PUBLIC
UTILITY.
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POINT THREE
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
FIND THAT THE DEFENDANT SALT LAKE CITY
IS WITHOUT RIGHT OR AUTHORITY TO CONSTRUCT OR OPERATE A WATER SYSTEM FOR THE
DELIVERY OF WATER TO RETAIL CONSUMERS
OUTSIDE OF ITS CORPORATE LIMITS OR TO REGULATE OR CONTROL THE DISTRIBUTION OF WATER THROUGH SUCH SYSTEM.

POINT FOUR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND
THAT THE DEFENDANT PUBLIC SERVICE ·COMMISSION OF UTAH HAS AUTHORITY AND THAT IT
IS ITS DUTY TO REGULATE THE SALE AND DISTRIBUTION OF WATER WHICH IS DISPOSED OF
BY THE DEFENDANT SALT LAKE CITY OUTSIDE
OF ITS CORPORATE LIMITS.

ARGUMENT
It will be noted that in the petition filed herein we
have joined as plaintiff a property owner and a tax payer
of Salt Lake City, Utah. The purpose of doing so was
to bring to the attention of the court the fact that the
tax payers of Salt Lake City as well as the County Water
System has a vital interest in the question of whether
or not the City may engage in the business of owning,
constructing or operating a culinary water system beyond
its corporate limits and to use the money of its tax payers
in such a venture. So also have we jointed as defendants a number of individual partnerships and corporations who are th·e owners of land within or adjoining
the area where the plaintiff corporation is engaged in
operating its water system. In so joining such land o\vnSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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13
ers, it was and is plaintiff's view that the statute requiring all interested persons to be made parties to a petition for a declaratory judgment makes it necessary to
join such land owners as parties to this proceeding. So
also does it seem that plaintiff is, by the statute, required to make the Metropolitan Water District of Salt
Lake City a party to this proceeding. Indeed the interests of such water district is so intimately interwoven
with the interest of Salt Lake City that any decree tha.t
may be entered curtailing the powers of Salt Lake City
is certain to affect the Metropolitan Water District of
Salt Lake City.
The defendant, Salt Lake County Conservancy District, includes territory of Salt Lake County outside of
the cities. Its powers and duties are defined in Chapter
9, Title 73, U.C.A. 1953. It may well have an intere'St
in the subject matter of this litigation and therefor it
vvas made a party defendant.
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
PETITION HEREIN.

This Court has had occa;sion to apply and construe
the Declaratory Judgment Act on a number of occasions, among which are Gray v. Defa, 103 U. 339; 135
Pac. ( 2d) 251; 253, Reed v. Anderson, 211 Pac. ( 2d) 206.
It will be seen from the foregoing cases that vvhile
the Act 'does not contain any provisions as to the pro._
ce·dure to be followed, this Court has indicated that the
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procedure -should he similar to that in civil cases generally and that the Act may be resorted to even though
some other form of action may be available.
At the outset of this proceeding, it may be well to
dispose of the case as it may affect the rights of the
parties against which no affirmative relief is sought. It
will be seen that the Act 78-33-11 requires that all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration are to he made parties and that
the rights of persons not parties are not prejudiced by
the judgment or decree entered. Also by 78-33-1 the
Court shall entertain jurisdiction if the relief sought is
merely to declare rights, status or other legal relations.
It was urged at the oral argument in the lower court
on behalf of the defendant, 1\tfetropolitan Water District
of Salt Lake City, that because plaintiff is not seeking
relief directly against it that therefore, the action should
be dismissed as to it. The language of the Act is not
subject to any such narrow construction. If the Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake City has any rights
or interest which would be affected by the declaratory
judgment prayed, it is by the Act required to be made a
party. The law creating and defining the powers of
Metropolitan Water District vvill be found in U.C.A. 1953,
Ttle 73, Chapter 8.
It will be seen from the Act creating the Metropolitan Water Districts that the sa1ne are to be so created
at the instance of the "legislative body of any 1nuniciSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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pality". U.C.A. 1953, 73-8-4 and 73-8-9. So also does the
Act provide that "in the sale, leasing and delivery of
water as hereinbefore provided, preference shall always
be given to the water requirements within the district,"
and that "Each city, the area of which shall be a p·art or
all of any district incorporated hereunder, shall have a
preference right to purchase from the district for distribution by such city, or any public utilty therein empowered by said city for the purpose, for ~domestic, municipal
and other beneficial uses within such city, etc." U.C.A.
1953, 73-8-18, subdivision (e), page 657. The Act further provides in U.C.A. 1953, 73-8-19, that "If any district shall include the area of only one municipality, then
the regularly appointed aitorney and the regularly appointed engineer of such municipality shall be, ex officio,
the attorney and engineer, respectively, of such district",
and 73-8-20 provides that "If any district shall include the
area of only one municipality, then the Board of Directors
shall consist of such number as the governing body of
that municipality shall determine." If these and other
provisions of the Act do not make the defendant, Metropolitan Water District, interested in the kind of a declaratory judgment that shall be rendered against the
defendant City, then indeed is it difficult to conceive of a
state of facts or of the law that would constitute such an
interest as that which requires one bringing an action under the declaratory judgment Act to bring in the parties
"who have or claim any interest which would be affected
by the declaration." U.C.A. 1953, 78-33-11. It may be
inquired, is not the defendant, Metropolitan Water DisSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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trict, interested in the question of whether or not Salt
Lake City may put in and operate a culinary water system
to supply the needs of all the people in Salt Lake County
or elsewhere~ It would seem to us that it is of vital concern to the District to know what area in Utah may be
served by Salt Lake City with culinary water and whether
or not the City is subject to the control of the defendant
Commission over water sold and delivered outside of the
limits of the city. These matters cannot help but affect
th·e am:ount of water that the city will purchase from the
District.
But suppose we are wrong in our contention that the
defendant, Metropolitan Water District, is without any
interest in the kind of declaratory judgment that may be
rendered against the defendant City, it has a simple way
of getting out of this litigation by disclaiming any interest in the subject matter of this litigation. Plaintiffs
have alleged that they have or claim to have such an
interest. If the defendant District admits that it has
an interest and sets out the nature of such interest, then
there may be an issue to be tried. If it disclaims any interest in the subject matter of this action, then, of course,
there will be nothing to try, and the plaintiffs may take
their judgment and the District will be bound by the
judginent entered. Such we believe to be the clear implication of the Declaratory Judgment Act. The relief
provided for by the Act is that a party may have determined and quieted his rights even though no other relief
is sought. The relief therein provided for is quite simSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ilar to the relief sought in the usual suit to quiet title.
The difference bering that in the Declaratory Judgment
Act it is rights of various kinds that may be quieted and
not merely rights to tangible property. This Court has
in effect so held in the case of Gray v. D·efa, 103 U. 339,
135 Pac. (2d) 251, 253, supra.
It is, of course, the approved practice in a suit to
quiet title to allege that a defendant claims some righ-t,
title or interest in the property involved in the action adverse to the rights of the plaintiff. Unless plaintiff is
advised of the specific cTaim made by a defendant, that i's
all that plaintiff is able to allege. The defendant knows
or should know what, if any, claim is made to property
in an action to quiet title. So in this case the defendants
know or should know what interest they claim in the· subject matter of the action that may be affected by the
judgment or decree which plaintiff seeks. To illustrate,
it may be that some of the defendants have a contract
with the defendant City as to the construction and operation of a water system outside of the city. If so, the
interest of such party would be affected by the granting
of the relief 'vhich plaintiffs seek. As heretofore stated,
if any defendant has no interest in the subject matter of
this litigation, it is a simple Ina.tter for such defendant
to make a disclaimer, in which event the Court can enter
the appropriate decree, which, of course, will be binding
on the disclaiming defendant. The plaintiffs have no desire to, and if they did have such a desire, they could not
force any defendant to litigate a matter in which such
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18
defendant makes a disclaimer, but the plaintiffs do have
a right to a determination of the questions posed by their
p·etition and when the same are determined to have such
determination become binding on the parties' to the action.
By the dismissal of the action without more it is to say
'
'
the least, very doubtful if such dismissal is equivalent to
an adjudication that the dismissed defendant is without
any interest in the subject matter of the action. Generally speaking, a judgment to be binding must he upon
the merits. If a 'defendant disclaims any interest in the
subject matter of the action, and in conformity therewith
the Court fin·ds that the defendant so disclaiming is without interest in the subject matter of the action, such declaration woul'd set the matter at rest and plaintiffrs could,
not thereafter be called upon to re-litigate the m·atters
dispose'd of in some future action such as is prOivided for
by U. C.A. 19·53, 78-33-8.
.

In the main, what we have said about the dismissal
of the action as to the 1\fetropolitan Water District applies to the other defendants, except as to the defendants
City and C·ommission. That is to say, if a defendant
against whom no relief is sought disclaims all interest in
the subject matter of the litigation, that should be an
end to the~ controversy with the defendant so disclaiming.
An entirely different situation is presented with respect to the defendant Commission and defendant City.
As to the Commission, it cannot well disclaim all interest in the subject matter of the litigation. If we are right
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in our contention the law fastens an interest upon the
defendant Commission in this litigation which it cannot
escape by a disclaimer. If we are wrong in our contention, the defendant Commission is doubtless interested in
being advised of such fact so that it may act accordingly.
Obviously the defendant City has an interest in the subject matter of this litigation because plaintiffs are seeking affirmative relief against the defendant City.

POINT TW·O
THE 'TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CON ..
STRUE THE PROVISIONS OF U.C.A. 1953, 54-2-1,
SUBDIVISIONS 3, 26 AND 28, TO THE EFFECT
THAT THE DEFENDANT, SALT LAKE CITY, IS
WITHOUT AUTHORITY TO SELL OR DELIVER ANY
WATER WITHIN THE AREA DESCRIBED IN PARA..
GRAPH 1 OF THE PETITION FILED HEREIN EXCEPT WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE DEFENDANT
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, AND ONLY TO
THE PLAINTIFF, COUNTY WATER SYSTEM, INC.,
OR OTHER PUBLIC UTILITY AS DEFINED BY
U.C.A. 1953, 54-2-1 SUBDIVISION 28, THEREOF.

It will be seen that by U.C.A. 1953, 54-2-1, subdivision 3 cities are expressly placed in the same class as
other corporations and by subdivision 26, corporations
owning, controlling, operating or managing any water
system for public service is a water corporation. By
subsection 28, a water corporation is a public utility and
as such subjeet to the jurisdiction of the defendant, Public Service Commission.

If, however, a corporation is

not engaged exclusively as a public utility, it shall be
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

20
governed by the public utility act only with respect to its
activities as a public utility, ·or it may dispose of its
surplus water to a public utility. Such is, we submit,
the expressed provisions of tlie Act above referred to.
If the defendant City may lawfully do as it chooses with
respect to the manner in which it shall dispose of its
surplus water outside of its boundaries, then indeed does
the whole fabric of our Public Utility Law become meaningless whenever a city chooses to make it so.
Thus, if the defendant City has the authority to do
what it claims the right to do, it may go into the area
which plaintiff is authorized to serve and there construct
a competing water system, charge rates so low as to
drive plaintiff out of business and, having once accomplished that end, increase the rates to su0h an extent as
to be reimbursed not only for any loss that may have
accrued by reason of the cheap rates, but also secure a
handson1e profit from the water sold after the plaintiff
has been driven out of business.
There was a time before the advent of the Public
Utility laws that such practice was legal and a common
practice by large corporations as a means of driving
small corporations out of business. One of the main purposes of the Public Utility Law is to condemn that practice.
It was argued in the Court below that Salt Lake
City is supreme and beyond the control of the defendant
Commission. As to water which it furnishes to the city'
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and its inhabitants, it would seem that the doctrine of the
case of Loga.n City v. Public Utilities Commission, 72 U.
536; 271 Pac. 961, leads to that result. Not so, however,
with respect to water which is supplied to areas beyond
the city. A city has a right to furnish water or electrical energy outside of its boundaries by reason of the
grant of such authority by the Legislature and not otherwise, such is the holding of the authorities generally. 37
Am. Jur. S.ec. 122, page 726 and 38 Am. Jur. Sec. 570,
page 258, and cases cited in footnotes.
If, as the authorities teach, a city may dispose of its
surplus water beyond its limits when and only when authorization to do so is granted by constitutional or legislative authority, it necessarily follows that the authority
granting the City such power may limit the condition
under which the same may be exercised. That is to say,
the defendant, Salt Lake City, must look to U.C.A. 1953,
10-8-14, wherein it is provided that they (cities) may sell
and deliver the surplus product or service of any such
works not required by the city or its inhabitants to others beyond the limits of the city for its authority to dispose of its surplus water outside of the city. The Legislature, having as it does the power to grant or withhold the right of a city to dispose of its surplus water
outside of its boundaries, it necessarily follows that the
Legislature may fix the conditions under which the city
may dispose of its surplus water outside of its limits.
It will be seen that by the provisions of U.C.A. 1953,
54-2-1, subdivision 3, cities are placed in the same class
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as other corporations. Tha.t being so, they are subject
to the same treatment as are other corporations, so far
as that is possible, especially where, as in U.C.A. 1953,
54-2-1, subdivision 28, it is so provided.
T·he Legislature having placed cities in the same -class
as other corporations, it must have intended that defendant City and plaintiff corporation should both comply
with the Public Utility Law and submit to the jurisdiction
and regulation of the defendant Commission. Much of
our argument applicable to Point Two is also applicable
to th·e matters which we wish to raise under Point Three.
It may be necessary to repeat some of our argument under Point Three, but we shall attempt to hold repetition
at a minimum.
POINT THREE
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
FIND THAT THE DEFENDANT SALT LAKE CITY
IS WITHOUT RIGHT OR AUTHORITY TO CONSTRUCT OR OPERATE A WATER SYSTEM FOR THE
DELIVERY OF WATER TO R.ETAIL CONSUMERS
OUTSIDE OF ITS CORPORATE LIMITS OR TO REGULATE OR CONTROL THE DISTRIBUTION OF WATER THROUGH SUCH SYSTEM.

It is the contention of the plaintiffs:
First: That while the defendant City may sell its
surplus water outside of its boundaries, it is without
authority to construct or operate a distributing system
for the distribution of water to retail consumers outside
of its boundaries.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

23
Second: If it shall be concluded that the defendant
City has authority to construct and operate a distributing system outside of its limits, it may not do so without being subject to the jurisdiction and regulation of
the defendant, Public Service Commission of-Utah.
As to the first point, the law is well settled in this
and other jurisdictions that cities have such power and
only such powers as are expressly granted, and those
necessarily or fairly implied or incident to the powers
expressly granted, and those essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of the corporations not simply convenient but indispensable. Dillon
Municipal corporations, 5th Ed. Sec. 237. Am,ericwn
Fork City v. Robinson, 77 Utah 168, 292 Pac. 249; Salt
Lake City v. Sutter, 61 Utah, 533; 216 Pac. 234. Rapid

Trawsit Co. v. Ogden City 89, Utah 546, 58 Pac. (2d) 1;
Am.erica,n Petroleum Co. et al. v. Ogd'en City et al., 90
Utah 465; 62 Pac. (2·d) 557; Salt Lake City v. Revine, 101
Utah 504; 124 Pac. (2d) 537.
It is also the settled law that municipal corporations
are generally confined in their operations to their own
corporate limits, and only when given special legislative
po-vver expressly or necessarily implied can they act extraterritorily. 37 Am. J ur. Sec. 122, page 736; 38 Am. J ur.
Sec. 570, page 258, and cases cited in footnotes to the
text. Moreover, when authority is given to a municipality to act beyond its limits, it is held to the same require ..
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ments as a private corporation engaged in the same business. The operation of a water system is a proprietary,
not a governmental function. Egelhoff v. Ogden City, 71
Utah 511; 267 Pac. 1011.
The statutory law of Utah granting cities the authority to sell and deliver water not required by the city
or its inhabitants which plaintiff seeks to have construed
is U.C.A. 1953, 10-8-14.
So that the Court may have readily available such
provision, we again quote the same :
"They (cities) may construct, maintain and
operate waterworks . . . . or authorize the construction, maintenance and operation of the same
by others., or purchase or lease such works from
any person or corporation and they may sell and
deliver the surplus p-roduct or service of any such
works not required by the city or its. inhabitants to
others beyond the limits of the city."
During the course of the oral argument in the Court
below, counsel for defendant City directed the attention
of the Court to a number of other statutory provisions,
among which are: U.C.A. 1953, 10-7-5, 10-7-10, 10-7-11,
10-7-14 and 10-8-2.
It will be seen that the p·rovisions of the law above
referred to by defendant City do not deal with water that
may be disposed of because not needed by the city, except possibly the provisions of U.C.A. 1953, 10-8-2. Moreover, if the defendant City "may do all things in relation
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thereto (dispose of its surplus water) as natural persons" and no more, then and in such case the City is subject to the regulation of the defendant Commission. It
is one of the cardinal principles of law applied in the construction of a statute that expressio wnius est exclusio
alterius. So the defendant City, having been .given the
same power to deal with its property as that possessed
by an individual, is excluded from the exercise of any
greater power. Obviously an individual owning a water
right could not lawfully do what the petitio11 alleges the
defendant City is doing and planning to do without having received from the commission a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity.
To revert to U.C.A. 1953, 10-8-t±, it will be seen t~at
the city is e1npowered to sell and deliver the surplus product or service of any such works not required by the city
or its inhabitants to others beyond the limits of the city.
Applying the rule that a city has only such powers
as are expressly conferred upon it, as stated in the foregoing cases, there is nothing in the Act which authorizes
the city to do a number of things concerning which plaintiffs complain in their petition. To illustrate, it would
be an extension of the language of the Act beyond the
breaking point to say that the fact that the city may sell
and deliver its surplus water, it necessarily follows that
it may "purchase retail water companies in the unincorporated area of Salt Lake County and assume to own,
operate and manage the same." "To take over the comSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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plete operation and control of .... pipe lines, deliver
water through such pipe lines . . .. fix the amount of
charges for each connection, collect such charges and exercise dominion over such pip·e lines the ~same as it could
do if it were the absolute owner thereof." "To prepare and
carry out an over-all plan to furnish culinary water to
all of the inhabitants of the area in which plaintiff County
Water System has a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity." "To arbitrarily do as it desires in the 1natter
of selling and delivering its surplus water and water
which is not surplus which it purchased from the Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake City and elsewhere
and sell and deliver the same outside of its limits at
rates and under conditions which it may establish from
time to time without being in any vvay subject to the
jurisdiction of the defendant Public Service Commission."
It is the contention of the plaintiffs that the city is
limited by the laws of the state of Utah above mentioned
to merely sell and deliver its surplus water and that it
may not engage in the business of constructing a water
system outside of its limits and after having done so
regulate such vvater system without any limitation, the
same as it can the water system within the city. If the
Legislature had intended to confer upon the city such
broad powers, it would have so provided.
While in our vievv the clear expressed lan_guage of
the Utility Act of Utah, namely Title 54, Chapter Tvvo
and Sections 1, subdivisions 3, 26 and 28 thereof ,vill
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admit of no construction other than that the defendant
City may not dispose of its surplus water except with
the approval and under the direction of the Public s.ervice Commission, we shall direct the attention of the Court
to a number of the leading cases in this and other jurisdictions where the question has been before the Commissions and Courts. In doing so \Ve shall cite and comn1ent on those cases which the defendant City, in the
Court below, clai1ned support its contention as well as
those which support the position of the plaintiffs.
Counsel for the defendant City in the Court below
cited, and apparently derived some comfort from, the
decision of this Court in the case of Mui,r v. Mu,rr:ay City,
decided Dec. 9, 1919, 55 Utah 368; 186 Pac. 433. It will
be seen from the opinion in that case that the contract
upon which the action was brought was entered into on
:Jfarch 20, 1914. The agreement provided for a loan by
plaintiff to defendant in the sum of $1,200.00, payable
in four annual installments evidenced by four Promissory Notes, one for $369.00, payable in one year; $334.00,
payable in two years; $336.00, payable in three years,
and $318.00, payable in four years. The City of l\furray
defended on the ground that the city was without power
to contract the indebtedness because the clairned obligation gre\v out of a transaction whereby the city purchased and developed an electric light plant which generated more electricity than \vas needed by the city, and
in order to dispose of the surplus energy the city constructed an electric transmission line for the purpose of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

28

delivering the surplus energy to "what is known as the
town or settlement of Granite, situated a distance of
about seven miles beyond the boundary line of Murray
City. It is made apparent by the opinion in that case
that the question of whether or not the defendant Commission had any jurisdiction in the matter under discussion was not and could not have been passed upon. The
defendant Commission did not come into existence until
1917, Laws of Utah 1917, Sec. 4775, et seq., while the
contract involved was executed in 1914. The Act creating the defendant Commission was not retroactive, and
·even if an attempt had been made to make it so, such attempt would of necessity be an attempt to impair the obligation of,a contract, contrary to the p.rovisions of our
state and federal constitution. Moreover, so far as appears from the opinion in that case, Murray City was
not going into the business of furnishing electrical energy generally to the public. Indeed, the opinion states
that "cities are not organized primarily for the purpose
of engaging in commercial enterprises, however profitable they may appear or even prove to be." Utah Report,
page 373.
It is readily conceded that the defendant Commission has no power over the city in its operation of its
water system within its boundaries. That is the effect
of the opinion of this Court 1n the case of
Logarn City v. Public Utilities Commission of Utah, et aJ.,
72 Utah 536, 271 Pac. 961. While that case involved an
electric power plant owned by the city, th.e principles of
law there announced are doubtless applicable to water
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systems owned by a city and used to supply its inhabitants with water. The case of Logan City v. Public Utilities Commission supra involves a number of questions
not here involved. Despite the length of the main
opinion and the two opinions concurring in the results,
it will be seen that the opinion and the concurring opinions lin1it the application to the city and its. inhabitants.
Indeed it could not have been otherwise, because the only
facts involved in the controversy related to power served
to the city and its inhabitants. The constitutional question there decided had theretofore been decided by the
Supreme Court of Colorado in the case of Holyoke v.
81nith, 75 Colo. 286; 226 Pac. 159, and by the Supreme
Court of Montana in the case of Public Service Com.mission v. City of Helena, 52 Mont. 527; 159 Pac. 24. The
holding of the Colorado case was approved and the holding of the Montana case rejected. It will be noted that the
case of Logan City v. Public Utilities Commission and
the Colorado case supra were both ruled on the ground
that granting to the Public Utilities Commission jurisdiction over matters relating to questions of purely local
self-government was inhibited by constitutional provisions there discussed. The question of the sa.le and delivery of electricity not needed by the city was not involved nor discussed. To say that the doing of the acts
by defendant City concerning which the plaintiffs complain in their petition is the performance of a Inunicipal
function obviously is not in accord with the facts. While
as is stated in the opinion in the Logan case supra, the
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ment of the city's plant that cannot be done by the people outside of the city. Every argument that can be advanced in favor of the wisdom of having the defendant
Commission control and regulate a private utility applies
to the defendant City when it engages in the business of
constructing and operating a system for furnishing water
to residents outside of the city.
In the case of Barnes et. al. v. Lehi City et al.,
74 Utah 321; 279 Pac. 878, it is he~d that a city is not
require·d to procure a Certificate of Covenience a.nd
Necessity from the Public Utilities Commission before
entering into a contract to enlarge its existing electric
power p·lant and enter into business of selling electrical
energy to its inhabitants, and .that if the plant of the
city is to be used to supp~ly city and its inhabitants with
electricity, the Industrial Commission is without jurisdiction over the ·plant. That case does not aid the defendants in this case.
In the case of City of Phoenix v. Wright et a.l., 80
Pac. (2d) 390, there was involved the construction of an
amendn1ent to the constitution made in 1912 which provided that "all corporations other than municipal engaged in .... furnishing water for irrigation or other
public purposes shall be deemed public service corporations." In construing the provisions of the Arizona constitution, it was held that such language excluded the
Corporation Commission of Arizona from regulating the
city of Phoenix in the service and delivery of water outside of its corporate limits. Obviously, if the ConstituSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tion of Arizona excluded municipal corporations from
being regulated by the Corporation Commission, such
constitutional provision must prevail.
The same question is presented and the same conclusion reached in the case of c·ity of Phoenix v. Kasu,m.,
97 Pac. (2d) 210. It is further held in this later Arizona
case that the Legislature has the right to regulate rates
charged by municipalities; that a city can dispose of only
its surplus water outside of the city. Some other questions vvere decided in that case which bear but remotely
if at all on the questions presented in this case.
In the case of Water Works Boa.rd of City of Mobile
v. City of Mobile, 43 S. (2d) 409, it is held among other

matters that under Sec. 401, Title 37, Code 1940 of Alabama, the WaterWorks Board could enter into a contract
for the sale of water without the approval of the Alabama
Public Service Commission. The provision of the law
referred to expressly granted the Board such. power,
namely to supply water not only to the inhabitants of
the 1nunicipality, but to the "surrounding territory."
In the case of Atlantic Canst. Co.

'l'.

City of Raleigh

(N. C.) 53, S.E. 165, there was involved the construction
of a law vvhich expressly gave the city jurisdiction over
its sevvage system both within and without the city. We
can find nothing in that case vvhich throws any light on
this case.
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·Another North ·Carolina case, Town of Grimesland
v. City of Washimgton, et al., 66 s. E. (2d) 794, cited by
counsel for defendant City, is of similar import as the
case of Atlarntic Canst. Co. v. City of Raleigh, supra. It
is further held in this later case that when a municipality undertakes functions beyond its governmental an4
police powers and engages in business to render public
service for p·rofit, it becomes amenable· by statute to regulate the same as any other corporation so engaged.
There is, of course, no controi\Tersy in this proceeding conce·rning the power of the city to sell and deliver
water outside of its limits, because the statutes of Utah
expressly grant such power and in the l\furray City case,
sup·ra, our Supreme Court has so held. The question
here presented by the plaintiff is: "What is the status
of the defendant City, and to what limitations if 'any is
the City subject to when it sells and delivers water outside of the City~" As we understand the City's position,
it is to the effect that it may do as it pleases. The plaintiffs' position is that when the City goes beyond the selling and delivery of water outside of the City it becon1es
subject to the jurisdiction of the defendant Commission
if indeed the defendant has authority to do anything ·with
respect to its surplus "rater other than to sell and deliver
the same.
In the case of Pacific Light and Power Corporation
v. City of Pasadena, P.U.R. 1920 A 194, the California
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tution and laws of the state of California and reached the
conclusion that the Commission had jurisdiction over
every corporation supplying electric energy for compensation generally to the public, including municipalities
rendering service outside of their corporate limits. That
case is very instructive, not because of the Railroad Commission being a tribunal of last resort, but because of the
thorough and learned manner in which the questions
presented are disposed of. It will be noted that the provisions of the California law discussed in the opinion are
substantially the same as the law of Utah.
The Circuit Court of Oregon in the case of Y am,hill
Electric Company v. City of McMinnville, etal., P.U.R,.
192, E. 353, held that a ·city has the right to construe~
and operate a utility plant at points outside of the city
but not to distribute currents in such suburban portions;
that the city may sell current to persons beyond its limits
but not to construct transmission or delivery facilities,
since its power of construction for distribution stops at
the city line, hence in the case of the city soliciting business, constructng lines and competing with an existing
electricity beyond its own limits, the city is on a par with
any other electric utility and could not continue to operate in that zone without a Certificate of Convenience and
Necessity from the Public Utilities Commission, and on
complaint of a rival utility, such further operation of
the city was enjoined.
That a ·statute which permits a city to opetate as a
public utility beyond its own boundaries and compete
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with other utilities in such territory without the formality of applying for a certificate fro~ the Public Utilities
Commission is unconstitutional as takng pToperty without due process of law.
In Re,x Moore, et al. v. Town of Evwnsville, P.U.R.
1952, it is held that:
"The Commission has jurisdiction over the
extra-territorial service of a municipal plant even
though the plant does not have statutory authority to render the same, and the fact that the service may not be compelled by persons residing outside of the corporate limits as a matter of right
does not deprive the commission of that jurisdiction.''
The foregoing case arose in Wyoming. In the course
of the opinion, this pertinent observation is made:
"If a municipality can lawfully sell its surplus
utility pToducts outside of its corporate limits
without interference or regulation by the Commission, as defendant's counsel claims it has the
right to do, then it rnay extend \vith impunity its
service facilities into the certificated area of a
sirnilar utility, compete \vith the latter, duplicate
its functions and services, pick and choose its custorners and generally violate all of the \Veil-settled
principies of utili t:~ regulation. These are the
things \Vhich our utilit:T act \Yas designed to prevent."
In the course of the foregoing opinion of the Public
Service Connnission of Wyorning, there is cited the case
of City of Olice Ilill 'C. Publi.c Ser~·ice Comn~ission et al.,
305 l(y. 2±7, ,;~here it is held that:
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"When the city supplied current outside of
its corporate limits, its exemption from regulation
as to rates and service by the Commission ceased
and the city came within the jurisdiction of the
Con1mission and was subject to such regulation
by it."

lvlulligan v. Miles City, 51 Mont. 374, 153 Pac. 276;
Sta,r Investment Co. v. City of Denver, P.U.R·. 1920 B.,
p. 684; Re City of Laurel, P.lT.R. 1921 D., p. 817.
~That

being true, the Con1mission should have
required the city to rnake its rates reasonable
and its service adequate rather than to have
granted certificates to appellees to enter the field
in which the city was already operating."
In the case of Town of IJ!Jilwatt(kee v. City of Jfilwa.1tkee, 87 P.U.R. 254 (Wis.) it is held that a mnuicipality in operating a water plant in a proprietary and not a
governmental capacity is a public utility with the san1e
obligations and duties and subject to the same statutes
as apply to non-municipal utilities; that a statute which
applies to any public utility or public utilities pertains
to 1nunicipal as well as non-municipal utilities. In that
case there is cited among others the case of p·abst Corp.
v. Milwa,u}cee, 190 Wis. 349, 208 N.vV. 493; A.L.R,. 1164,
\V

here it is so held.
It is held in Re Loveland Municipal Water Works,

83 P.U.R. 72, that the Colorado Public Utilities Commission has jurisdiction over the extra-terri to rial operation
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of a municip-al plant although it is without jurisdiction
over a municipal utility operating only inside the corporate limits. In support of such decision the case of
Lamar v. Wiley, 80 ·Cal. 18; 248 Pac. 1009 is cited. In
this case the Supreme Court of Colorado in a decision
rendered on J'uly 6, 1926 held that when a municipality
furnishes p·ublic service to its own citizens and in connection therewith supplies its products to consumers
outside of its territorial boundaries, it is as to such outside customers attended with the same conditions and
subject to the same control and sup·ervsion that apply to
a private public utility owner who furnishes like service.
The Colorado court cites in support of its conclusion the
case of Hillsboro v. Public Service Commission, 97 Ore.
320, 187 Pac. 617, and City of South Pasadena v. Pasadena Larnd & Wal.e.r Co., 152 Cal. 379, 93 Pac. 49. The
case from Colorado above cited is of special weight here
because of not only the principles of law therein announced, but also because this Court in the case of Logan
City, supra, is based in great part upon the ca.se of
Holyoke v. Sm.ith, 75 Colo. 286, 226 Pac. 158, which was
decided in 1924. In the later Colorado case, the Supreme
Court very clearly and forceably points out the reason
'vhy the Public Utility Con11nission should and does have
jurisdiction over a municipally owned facility as to product sold or services rendered to non-residents of the municipality, but no:t to the residents thereof.

While the

Court may be unable to read all of the cases cited, we
urge it to reald this later Color'ado case.
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In the Court below counsel for defendant City placed
considerable stress on the case of City of Englewood v.
City and County of Denver et al., 229 Pac. (2d) 667. An
examination of that case shows that it is readily distinguishable from this case. At the outset it will be noted
that the case of City of Lamar v. Town of Wiley, 80 Colo.
18, 248 Pac. 1009, supra, was not overruled, but approved
because the question of whether Lamar was a public
utility furnishing electricity beyond its border was not
an issue, while in the present case Denve-r was resisting
the jurisdiction. We had always understood the law to
be that jurisdiction over subject matter could not he acquired by the consent of the parties to a controversy.
The la\v in such particular is thus stated in 31 Am. Jur.,
Sec. 408, page 71 :
"It is essential to the proper rendition of
a judgment that the Court have jurisdiction of
the subject matter. A judgment rendered without jurisdiction of the subject matter is void. The
operation of this rule is not affected by the judicial discretion of a Court."
Among the great number of eases cited in a footnote
to the text is R·e Christiansen, 17 Utah 412; 53 Pac. 1003,
later appeal23 Utah 209; 63 Pac. 896.
The basis for the decision of the Supreme Court of
Colorado in the case of the City of Englewood v. City a.nd
County of D·enver, supra, is bottorned on laws of Colorado that are wholly unlike any laws in this state. We
quote the following from the opinion in the Englewood
case, 229 Pac. (2d) 671:
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"Chapter 163, '35 C.S.A., Sec. 22:
"Supply water to outside consmners.-The
incorporated to\vns and cities of the state of
Colorado are hereby empowered to supply water
from their water systems to consumers outside
of the corporate limits of the said cities and
towns; and to collect therefor such charges and
upon such conditions and limitations as said
towns and cities may impose by ordinance. (1.
'11, p. 522, Sec. 1; C.L., Sec. 8999.) ."
"Article 8, Chapter 137, '35 C.S.A., Sec. 57.Commission to enforce constitution and la\vs.-It
is hereby made the duty of the commission to see
that the provisions of the constitution and statutes of this state affecting public utilities, the enforcement of \vhich is not specifically vested in
some other officer or tribunal, are enforced and
obeyed, .... "
The opinion also quotes a provision of the la\v of
the state of ·Colorado which provides that any lease of
water fo1· use outside of the municipality \vith a population of 1nore than 200,000 shall not give the lessee any
vested right which will prevent the termination of the
lease by the municipality. This Court 1nay take judicial notice of the fact that the city and county of D·enver had a population of more than 200,000 in 1951, \Vhen
the opinion in the City of Englewood case supra \vas
rendered. There are no statutory provisions in lTtah
compHra.ble with th'ose quoted and relied upon by the
Supreme Court of Colorado in the Engle\vood case.
Thus the laws of Colorado expressly authorized the
cities and towns of Colorado to not only sell but to
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"collect therefor such charges and upon such conditions
and limitations as said towns and cities may impose by
ordinance" and the Commission was given jurisdiction
to enforce the constitutional and statutory provisions
of the state where such duty and power wa:s not specifically vested in ·some other officer or tribunal.
In the Court below, counsel for the defendant City
referred to the provisions of Article 11, Sec. 6 wherein
it is provided that "no municipal corporation shall directly or indirectly lease, sell, alien or dispose of any
vvater works, water rights, or sources of water supply
now or hereafter to be owned or controlled by it, but
all such water works, water rights and sources of water
supply now owned or hereafter to be acquired by a municipal corporation shall be preserved, maintained and
operated by it for supplying its inhabitants with water
at reasonable charges. Provided that nothing herein
contained shall be construed to prevent any such municpal corporation from exchanging water rights, or
sources of \vater supply, for other water rights or sources
of water supply of equal value, and to be devote d in like
1nanner to the public supply of its inhabitants."
1

If the foregoing constitutional provision 1s adhered to literally, the defendant City is without authority to sell or lease any of its water or water right
for use beyond its boundaries and that provision of
U.C.A. 1953, 10-8-14 which authorizes cities to sell and
deliver the surplus product or service of any such
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works not required by the city or its inhabitants to
others beyond the limits of the city is in conflict with
the constitution and therefore void. It will be seen
that the constitutional provision just quoted provides
that the water "shall be preserved, maintained and op. erated by it for supplying its inhabitants with water at
reasonable prices." Nowhere by the state constitution
is any authority granted a municipality to sell or dispose of its water to anyone other than the inhabitants
of the city, quite the contrary as will be seen from the
language just quoted. We entertain grave doubts that
the courts will give such constitutional provision such
construction, but if full effect is given to the language it
follows that the water belonging to the city must he used
to supply the inhabitants with water and for no other
purpose, that is to say, the constitution having sp·ecified
the p·urpose for which the water must be used, it thereby
excludes all other uses.
Be tha.t as it may, it surely would be an un'varranted construction of the constitutional provision heretofore quoted to say that notwithstanding the constitution provides that the water owned by the city must
he preserved, maintained and operated by it for supplying its inhabitants with water, it is also a n1unicipal
function for the city to construct and operate a w·ater
system outside of th·e city for non-residents. There is
another provision of our law dealing with Public lTtilities that is so unlike the Colorado law involved in the
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sion reached in that case inapplicable to the instant case.
It will be recalled that the Colorado law heretofore
quoted expressly grants to cities the right to supply
and collect such charges for water under such conditions and limitations as the towns and cities may impose.
So also the ·Colorado Commission is expressly granted
permission to enforce only such provisions of the constitution and law as are not specifically vested in some
other officer or tribunal.
Under our state law creating the Public Utilities
Commission it is p·rovided in 54-2-1 that:
"The term corporation includes a corporation, a municipal corporation and an association
and a joint stock company having any powers
or privileges not possessed by individuals or
partnerships. ~1unicipal corporations includes all
cities, counties or towns or other governmental
units created or organized under any general or
special law of this state."
In the case of Logan City v. Public Utiliti.es CoJJzmission, 72 Utah 536, 271 Pac. 961, an attempt was n1ade
by the writer of the main opinion that notwithstanding
the language just quoted, the Legislature did not intend
to give the Public Utilities Commission any jurisdiction
over any of the facilities or products of Inunicipalties.
The majorty of the Court, however, refused to go along
with the main opinion in that particular, but on the contrary two members of the Court held that the statutory
provision above quoted included municipal corporation:-:;.
·One of the justices dissented.
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Moreover, the argument made in the main opinion
is founded on language used in other provisions of our
statutory law which it was argued are inc-onsistent with
a construction of the law that would give to the Commission jurisdiction over electrical energy that was used
for the purpose of furnishing electric energy to the city
and its inhabitants.- No such language is found in our
statutory law with respect to water owned by the city.
There is the p·rovision of the constitution above quoted
which, if followed literally, would preclude the city from
devoting the \Yater owned by the city for any purpose
other than to supply the inhabitants of the city with water
at reasonable charges. The· fact that the defendant Commission is without jurisdiction to regulate the water
owned by the defendant City and used by it for the purpose of supplying the city and its inhabitants with water
does not preclude the defendant Commission from regulating the water that the city may sell beyond its lin1its.
It was argued by counsel for the defendant City, in
the Court below, that because the defendant City could
dispose of only its surplus water that therefore the defendant Commission cannot control the actions of the
city because the city is not a public utility in that it does
not and cannot hold itself out to serve all "\Vho might apply for water. The fact that th·e defendant City n1ay
sell only its surplus \Vater n1akes against the contention
that it should not and is not subject to the jurisdiction
of the defendant Co1nmission. The purpose of the Public Utility Act is to protect the public. If the ,Yater
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supply of the city is likely to be discontinued as to nonresidents, it is of vital concern to such non-residents that
some provision is made for such non-residents to be
supplied with water if and when the defendant City
ceases to take care of their needs. It is the duty of the
defendant Conunission to provide for the protection of
such non-residents as to their water supply. If the defendant Commission is without jurisdiction of the water
sold to non-residents, then and in such case it is powerless to protect the non-resident citizen who is a customer
of a vvater system operated by the defendant City. A
number of the cases heretofore cited in this brief point
out the evils that will flow from depriving the Utilities
Commission from jurisdiction over water that may be
sold by a municipality outside of its boundaries. The
Circuit Court of Oregon in the case heretofore cited goes
so far as to hold that such a law is unconstitutional.
.J1any of the cases heretofore cited hold that a city when
selling water outside of its boundaries is subject to the
same law that is applicable to a private person or corporation engaged in the same business. There is no
good reason why a city should be given any special privileges when it departs from its municipal functions of
governing the inhabitants.
Article 6, Section 26 provides :
''The Legislature is prohibited from enacting
any private or special law in the follovving cases:

16. Granting to an individual, association or
corporation any privilege, inununity or franchise.
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17. In all cases where a general law can be
applicable, no special law shall be enacted."
In connection with the law involved in this action,
it should be noted that the police or governmental power
of the defendant City is not involved. Our courts and
the courts generally, as will be se·en from the cases hereto£ ore cited, are engaged in the exercise of their proprietary functions when operating a water system. Among
the Utah cases so holding are: Brown v. Salt Lake City,
33 U. 222, 93 Pac. 570; Egelhoff v. Ogden City, 71 U. 511,
267 Pac. 1011.
U.C.A. 1953, 54-2-1, which plaintiffs seek to have construed, provides that: '~the term 'public utility' includes
every water corporation \v·hich performs a service for or
delivers a commodity to the public for which any compensation or payment whatsoever is received, such \Vater
corporation is hereby declared to be a public utility, subject to the jurisdiction and regulation of the connnission
and to the provisions of this title ..... Any corporation
or person not engaged in the business exclusively as a
public utility as hereinbefore defined shall be governed
by the provisions of this Act in respect only to the public utilities or p·ublic utility owned, controlled, operated
or managed hy it or by him, and not in respect to any
other business or pursuit."
When th·e provision just quoted is construed in connection with the definiton that the· term corporation shall
include a municipal as defined in Sec. 54-2-1 there ''yould
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seem to be no escape from the conclusion that the defendant City is subject to the jurisdiction of the defendant Commission as to water disposed of outside of the
city.
If there is any doubt about the meaning of the language just quoted, the remainder of the statutory law
which plaintiffs seek to have construed would seem t.Q
remove such uncertainty "\vhere it is provided that "when
any person, association or company or corporation,
not engaged in business as a public utility as defined
by this act shall be able to produce a surplus of ... water
beyond the needs of its own business and shall desire to
sell, exchange, 'deliver or otherwise di'spose of such surplus to or with any public utility, then the ·Contract with
the public utility shall be subject to the ap·proval or disapproval of the defendant Commi~ssion." The act then
proceeds to provide that "Such person, company, corporation or association selling or exchanging such surplus
product under such authorized contract ·shall not thereby
become a public utility within the meaning of this act, nor
shall it be subject to the jurisdiction of the. ·Commis,sion."
Thus if effect is given to the language just referred to
and quoted, the defendant City is subject to the jurisdiction of the defen'dant Commission if and when it choo:ses.
to dispose of its surplus water, especially by operating a
di'stributing system outside of its boun daries. If, how1

ever, the surplus water is sold to a public utility then an d
in such case the defen:dant City is not subject to the
1
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juris-diction of the defendant Commission. To given any
other construction to the act would be at w.ar with the
expresseld language of the act.

POINT FOUR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND
THAT THE DEFENDANT PUBLIC SERVICE ·COMMISSION OF UTAH HAS AUTHORITY AND THAT IT
IS ITS DUTY TO REGULATE THE SALE AND DISTRIBUTION OF WATER WHICH IS DISPOSED OF
BY THE DEFENDANT SALT LAKE CITY OUTSIDE
OF ITS CORPORATE LIMITS.

The defendant Comn1ission by its Motion sought to
have the proceeding dismissed as to it upon two grounds:
First: The Con1plaint fails to state a claim against defendant up·on which relief can be granted.
Second: The plaintiffs have not exhausted their administrative remedy and thus this action is premature
as to the defendant.
As to the first ground, n1uch of what has been said
about the other defendants \Yho sought and were granted
a dismissal applies to the Com1nission's first ground. It
vvill be noted that the Declaratory Judgment Act provides that resort may be had to the Act to ter1ninate a
controversy or renzove an uncertainty. U.C.A., 1953, 7833-5. That there is a controversy is Inade apparent by
the· fact that plaintiffs sought the relief prayed for in
their petition and the defendant ·sought to have the action
dis1nissed because as set out in its first grounds for dismissal, no rc·lief n1ay be granted. Plaintiffs contend not
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only that relief may be granted, but that the relief prayed
for should be granted. Thus there is a very substantial
controversy that the Court must resolve one way or the
other, that is to say, the Court is required to determine
the facts as directed by U.C.A. 1953, 78-33-9 and then
apply the law as directed by U.C.A. 1953, 78-33-1 and 7833-2 and having done so, enter the appropriate judgment.
As heretofore indicated a mere dismissal of the petition
leaves everything connected with the controversy and uncertainty undecided .
.J._.\.s to the second ground of the Commission's Motion
to Disn1iss, it will be seen that plaintiffs are here seeking a deter1nination of vvhether or not the Commission has
jurisdiction over the defendant City with respect to water
sold and delivered outside of its corporate limits. It
vvould be a hazardous undertaking for plaintiffs to seek
the relief which they are· here seeking before the defendant Commission. It will be seen that the Declaratory
Judgment Act vests the district courts, within their respective jurisdictions, with power to grant relief under
the Declaratory Judgment Act. No such power is vested.
in the defendant Commission, and even if it were, such
fact would not preclude the plaintiffs from availing themselves of the remedy provided for in the Declaratory
Judgment Act. Gray v. Defa., supra.
Moreover, it may well result in the waste of considerable time and expense to seek the views of the defendant
Commission as to whether or not it has jurisdiction over
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the defendant City's operations outside of its limits. If
the Commission should assume jurisdiction, and upon a
review of such decision it was found that it was without
jurisdiction, the time and expense of presenting the facts
which may be deemed material would be lost motion,
whereas hy proceeding under the Declaratory Judgment
Act, the law can be settled and such proceedings may
then be had as is in conformity with the law so determined. That is one of the results which the declaratory
judgment act is calculated to accomplish. Plaintiffs claim
that defendant Con1mission has jurisdiction over the
waters the defendant City sells outside of its limits. By
the action of the trial Court we are at a loss to kno'v upon
which of the grounds urged by the Con1mission were by
the Court deemed fatal to plaintiff's petition.
To summarize plaintiffs contend:
1. That this action brought by plaintiffs under the
declaratory judgment act is in the nature of an action
to quiet title and as such is not subject to dismissal,
but if any defendant claims no interest in the subject
matter of this action, such party may be released from
costs and further appearance in the action by filing a disclaimer.
2.

That the defendant, 1\fetropolitan ,,. .ater District

of Salt Lake City is so tied in with the defendant City
that it, as a matter of law, has an interest in the subject
matter of this action. If it desires to he relieved of any
liability for costs or other further p·articipation in this
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action, its remedy· is by a disclaimer and not by a dismissal of the action, because the plaintiffs are entitled
to a judgment or decree that will be binding on the Metropolitan 'Vater district which plaintiffs would probably
not have if the action were dismissed as to it or as to
any defendant against whom the action is dismissed.

3. That the plaintiffs are entitled to affirmative relief' against the defendant Commission decreeing that it
has jurisdiction of the subject matter of this controversy and requiring said defendant to assume jurisdiction thereof. ~rhat the p]aintiffs are entitled to avail
themselves of the declaratory judgment act and to do so
they must proceed in the district court, and therefore the
law applicable to the necessity of first seeking administrative relief has no application to this proceeding.
That the defendant Commission has jurisdiction
over the surplus water of the defendant City which is sold
4.

outside of its boundaries because the provisions of the
la\v here sought to have construed so provides, and the
adjudicated cases fro1n this and other jurisdictions lend
support to such contention.

5. That plaintiffs are entitled to have set at rest
the construction of the statutory laws here brought in
cruestion so that they may govern themselves accordingly,
and a dis1nj ssal of the action will not accomplish that result.
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We submit that the judgment of dismissal should be
reversed and the defendant Commission be directed to
assume jurisdiction of the surplus water which Salt Lake
City seeks to dispose of outside of its limits and that such
Commission control and regulate the sale and distribution
of such waters in the sarne manner as waters of other
"water corporations."
Respectfully submitted,

ALTON

~IEL VILLE

ELIAS HANSEN
Attorneys for plaintiff
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